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Federalist No. 7

Hamilton again pursues the benefits of union and the dangers that would ensue from independent states or separate confederacies.   He repeats several of the arguments made in earlier Federalists, but augments them with examples. He seems especially attentive to altercations involving his own state of New York. Reading between the lines, appealing to parochial interests is good political strategy for winning approval of union.

The Federalist No. 7

Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (continued)



To the People of the State of New York:

IT IS sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other? It would be a full answer to this question to say — precisely the same inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the nations in the world. But, unfortunately for us, the question admits of a more particular answer. There are causes of differences within our immediate contemplation, of the tendency of which, even under the restraints of a federal constitution, we have had sufficient experience to enable us to form a judgment of what might be expected if those restraints were removed.

The question of what possibly could induce the States to make war on one another, is sometimes asked as though it were inconceivable. But this is actually a real possibility and as such deserves a real answer.  That answer is that the States would be subject to the same inducements to war that have bloodied all nations of the world.   However, in our case there are other, more specific motivations.  We’ve already had some experience of them, even under the restraints of a federal constitution.  That being the case, we should be able to predict what might happen if those restraints were removed.

Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations. Perhaps the greatest proportion of wars that have desolated the earth have sprung from this origin. This cause would exist among us in full force. We have a vast tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States. There still are discordant and undecided claims between several of them, and the dissolution of the Union would lay a foundation for similar claims between them all. It is well known that they have heretofore had serious and animated discussion concerning the rights to the lands which were ungranted at the time of the Revolution, and which usually went under the name of crown lands. The States within the limits of whose colonial governments they were comprised have claimed them as their property, the others have contended that the rights of the crown in this article devolved upon the Union; especially as to all that part of the Western territory which, either by actual possession, or through the submission of the Indian proprietors, was subjected to the jurisdiction of the king of Great Britain, till it was relinquished in the treaty of peace. This, it has been said, was at all events an acquisition to the Confederacy by compact with a foreign power. It has been the prudent policy of Congress to appease this controversy, by prevailing upon the States to make cessions to the United States for the benefit of the whole. This has been so far accomplished as, under a continuation of the Union, to afford a decided prospect of an amicable termination of the dispute. A dismemberment of the Confederacy, however, would revive this dispute, and would create others on the same subject. At present, a large part of the vacant Western territory is, by cession at least, if not by any anterior right, the common property of the Union. If that were at an end, the States which made the cession, on a principle of federal compromise, would be apt when the motive of the grant had ceased, to reclaim the lands as a reversion. The other States would no doubt insist on a proportion, by right of representation. Their argument would be, that a grant, once made, could not be revoked; and that the justice of participating in territory acquired or secured by the joint efforts of the Confederacy, remained undiminished. If, contrary to probability, it should be admitted by all the States, that each had a right to a share of this common stock, there would still be a difficulty to be surmounted, as to a proper rule of apportionment. Different principles would be set up by different States for this purpose; and as they would affect the opposite interests of the parties, they might not easily be susceptible of a pacific adjustment.

Territorial disputes have frequently provided the most fertile ground for sowing discord and hostility among nations.  In fact, it’s possible that this is the most common source of war.  This is a factor that would definitely affect us.  We have a vast tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States.  There are still unresolved claims between several of the States contesting ownership.  If the Union were dissolved, it would open the way for similar claims between all the States.  It is common knowledge that the States have had numerous serious and animated discussions about the rights to “crown lands” which were “un-granted” during the Revolution.  The States within the limits of whose colonial governments they were comprised have claimed these lands as their property.  Other States have contended that the rights of the crown in these lands now belong to the Union, especially for lands that were in the Western territory.  Lands within the Western territory may have belonged to the Crown outright or through subjugation of the Indians, until relinquished in the treaty of peace.  The States that argue that crown lands belong to the Confederacy contend that the Confederacy acquired these lands via a compact with a foreign power.  Congress has wisely attempted to circumvent controversy by prevailing upon the States to concede the crown land to the United States for the benefit of the whole.  So far this has worked, and under continued union, seems likely to continue to do so.  A dismemberment of the Confederacy, however, would revive this dispute, and would create others like it.   Currently, a large part of the vacant Western territory is implicitly, if not explicitly now the common property of the Union.  If that were ended, the States which ceded their lands for the sake of federal compromise, would be likely to reclaim their lands, reasoning that the purpose for having ceded them is no longer valid.  The other States would undoubtedly make their own claims based on representation.  They would argue that once a grant is made, it cannot be taken back.  They would insist that it is only fair that territory acquired or secured by dint of the joint efforts of the Confederacy belongs to all in proportion.  Let’s say for the sake of argument that it was agreed that each State had a right to this common stock, it would still be nearly impossible to get agreement as to the proper distribution.  Each state would have its own notion of what was fair and appropriate, and it might be impossible to peacefully reconcile competing interests.

In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we perceive an ample theatre for hostile pretensions, without any umpire or common judge to interpose between the contending parties. To reason from the past to the future, we shall have good ground to apprehend, that the sword would sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter of their differences. The circumstances of the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, respecting the land at Wyoming, admonish us not to be sanguine in expecting an easy accommodation of such differences. The articles of confederation obliged the parties to submit the matter to the decision of a federal court. The submission was made, and the court decided in favor of Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave strong indications of dissatisfaction with that determination; nor did she appear to be entirely resigned to it, till, by negotiation and management, something like an equivalent was found for the loss she supposed herself to have sustained. Nothing here said is intended to convey the slightest censure on the conduct of that State. She no doubt sincerely believed herself to have been injured by the decision; and States, like individuals, acquiesce with great reluctance in determinations to their disadvantage.

This issue of Western territory could provide ample cause for hostilities between the States if there were not a common judge to arbitrate between the contending parties.  History tells us that the sword would likely become the final means of arbitration.  Take for example, the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania over the land in the Wyoming Valley.*  This should tell us not to be too optimistic about an easy resolution of differences.  The articles of confederation obliged the parties to submit the matter to the decision of a federal court.  They did so, and the court decided in favor of Pennsylvania.  Connecticut made no secret of her dissatisfaction with the ruling, and neither did she appear to be totally resigned to it, until she was given something like an equivalent to make up for the presumed loss. Considerable negotiation and management were required to conclude the matter peacefully. This isn’t to suggest that Connecticut did anything wrong.  She no doubt sincerely believed herself to have been injured by the decision; and States, like individuals, acquiesce very reluctantly when things aren’t decided in their favor.

Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of the transactions which attended the progress of the controversy between this State and the district of Vermont, can vouch the opposition we experienced, as well from States not interested as from those which were interested in the claim; and can attest the danger to which the peace of the Confederacy might have been exposed, had this State attempted to assert its rights by force. Two motives preponderated in that opposition: one, a jealousy entertained of our future power; and the other, the interest of certain individuals of influence in the neighboring States, who had obtained grants of lands under the actual government of that district. Even the States which brought forward claims, in contradiction to ours, seemed more solicitous to dismember this State, than to establish their own pretensions. These were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. New Jersey and Rhode Island, upon all occasions, discovered a warm zeal for the independence of Vermont; and Maryland, till alarmed by the appearance of a connection between Canada and that State, entered deeply into the same views. These being small States, saw with an unfriendly eye the perspective of our growing greatness. In a review of these transactions we may trace some of the causes which would be likely to embroil the States with each other, if it should be their unpropitious destiny to become disunited.

Those privy to the specifics of what transpired in the controversy between New York and Vermont, can vouch for just how dicey things could have gotten for the Confederacy had New York decided to assert its rights by force. ** Two things prevented this from happening, one a desire to maintain our future power, and the other, the interests of some influential people in neighboring States.  These influential individuals had obtained land grants under the jurisdiction of Vermont.  Even the States which made claims, in contradiction to ours, seemed more anxious to dismember New York, than to establish their own claims.  These States were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. New Jersey and Rhode Island.  They developed a sudden benevolent interest in favor of independence for Vermont, as did Maryland until it looked like a connection between Vermont and Canada was beginning to develop.  These States, being small, looked with growing dismay at the prospect of New York’s increasing prosperity and influence.  A review of what happened in these cases demonstrates the kinds of things likely to cause strife between the States if they are  disunited.

The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention. The States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbors. Each State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar to itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would beget discontent. The habits of intercourse, on the basis of equal privileges, to which we have been accustomed since the earliest settlement of the country, would give a keener edge to those causes of discontent than they would naturally have independent of this circumstance. We should be ready to denominate injuries those things which were in reality the justifiable acts of independent sovereignties consulting a distinct interest. The spirit of enterprise, which characterizes the commercial part of America, has left no occasion of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all probable that this unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of trade by which particular States might endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens. The infractions of these regulations, on one side, the efforts to prevent and repel them, on the other, would naturally lead to outrages, and these to reprisals and wars.

Competition for trade would be another area likely to cause contention.  The States situated less advantageously would be eager to improve their situation and desirous of sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbors.  Each State, or separate confederacy, would create its own unique system of commercial policy. This would result in all sorts of preferences, exclusions, and unique policies that would cause arguments. Because of the fact that we have enjoyed relatively equal privilege in commerce up to now, changing the situation would be harder to swallow than for countries without this history of peaceful interplay.  In such a situation we would be likely to take offense at things that are actually justifiable acts of independent sovereignties defending their own interests.  The enterprising spirit of commerce in America has been unbounded.  Given this unbridled entrepreneurial nature, it is likely that people would circumvent individual State laws and regulations enacted to provide advantage to those state’s citizens.  Such infractions and efforts to counter them would lead to outrages, and these to reprisals and wars.

The opportunities which some States would have of rendering others tributary to them by commercial regulations would be impatiently submitted to by the tributary States. The relative situation of New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey would afford an example of this kind. New York, from the necessities of revenue, must lay duties on her importations. A great part of these duties must be paid by the inhabitants of the two other States in the capacity of consumers of what we import. New York would neither be willing nor able to forego this advantage. Her citizens would not consent that a duty paid by them should be remitted in favor of the citizens of her neighbors; nor would it be practicable, if there were not this impediment in the way, to distinguish the customers in our own markets. Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit? Should we be long permitted to remain in the quiet and undisturbed enjoyment of a metropolis, from the possession of which we derived an advantage so odious to our neighbors, and, in their opinion, so oppressive? Should we be able to preserve it against the incumbent weight of Connecticut on the one side, and the co-operating pressure of New Jersey on the other? These are questions that temerity alone will answer in the affirmative.

Some States would be able to put others at a disadvantage via their regulations on trade.  The disadvantaged States wouldn’t be happy about it.  Take for example, the relative situation of New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey.  New York relies on import duties for its main source of revenue.  Most of these import duties are paid by the inhabitants of Connecticut and New Jersey who are consumers of what New York imports.  New York would neither be willing nor able to forego this advantage.  The citizens of New York would never consent to paying a duty that is not also paid by the citizens of neighboring States.  It would be impractical to make special rules for different customers.  Do we think Connecticut and New Jersey would put up with being taxed by New York solely for New York’s benefit?  Would New York be able to long retain its metropolitan status and advantages by continuing in a practice so abhorrent and oppressive to its neighbors?  With New Jersey on the one side and Connecticut on the other, the end result would not be good for New York.

The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision between the separate States or confederacies. The apportionment, in the first instance, and the progressive extinguishment afterward, would be alike productive of ill-humor and animosity. How would it be possible to agree upon a rule of apportionment satisfactory to all? There is scarcely any that can be proposed which is entirely free from real objections. These, as usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse interest of the parties. There are even dissimilar views among the States as to the general principle of discharging the public debt. Some of them, either less impressed with the importance of national credit, or because their citizens have little, if any, immediate interest in the question, feel an indifference, if not a repugnance, to the payment of the domestic debt at any rate. These would be inclined to magnify the difficulties of a distribution. Others of them, a numerous body of whose citizens are creditors to the public beyond proportion of the State in the total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous for some equitable and effective provision. The procrastinations of the former would excite the resentments of the latter. The settlement of a rule would, in the meantime, be postponed by real differences of opinion and affected delays. The citizens of the States interested would clamour; foreign powers would urge for the satisfaction of their just demands, and the peace of the States would be hazarded to the double contingency of external invasion and internal contention.

The public debt of the Union would be still another cause of contention between the separate States or confederacies.  Apportioning the debt and trying to get it paid off are also likely to result in animosity between the States.  How is it possible to determine a fair division of debt that would satisfy all parties?  This would be nearly impossible.  The degree of difficulty would be exacerbated by the competing interests of the parties involved.  The States can’t even agree on whether or not the debt should be paid.  Some of the States don’t value national credit or have poorer citizens, and consequently are either indifferent or even vehemently opposed to repaying domestic debt.  These States would make this problem even more difficult.   Then there are other states who have citizens holding debts (as creditors to the nation) in excess to that owed by their State.  These citizens would, of course be eager to ensure that they get their money back, whatever is done.  Any delay in an effective settlement would be bound to irritate these creditor States.  And delays would take place,  by necessity, because of differences of opinion and negotiations.   The citizens of these creditor States would clamor for resolution and foreign powers would also seek satisfaction for their just demands.  Thus there would be two likely sources of war – one from external invasion and the other from internal contention.

Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule surmounted, and the apportionment made. Still there is great room to suppose that the rule agreed upon would, upon experiment, be found to bear harder upon some States than upon others. Those which were sufferers by it would naturally seek for a mitigation of the burden. The others would as naturally be disinclined to a revision, which was likely to end in an increase of their own incumbrances. Their refusal would be too plausible a pretext to the complaining States to withhold their contributions, not to be embraced with avidity; and the non-compliance of these States with their engagements would be a ground of bitter discussion and altercation. If even the rule adopted should in practice justify the equality of its principle, still delinquencies in payments on the part of some of the States would result from a diversity of other causes — the real deficiency of resources; the mismanagement of their finances; accidental disorders in the management of the government; and, in addition to the rest, the reluctance with which men commonly part with money for purposes that have outlived the exigencies which produced them, and interfere with the supply of immediate wants. Delinquencies, from whatever causes, would be productive of complaints, recriminations, and quarrels. There is, perhaps, nothing more likely to disturb the tranquillity of nations than their being bound to mutual contributions for any common object that does not yield an equal and coincident benefit. For it is an observation, as true as it is trite, that there is nothing men differ so readily about as the payment of money.

Let us suppose that these difficulties in apportionment were surmounted.  It is still easy to predict that, in practice, some States would have a harder time complying than others.  Those struggling would look to mitigate their burden.  The other States wouldn’t easily agree as it would mean their paying more.  Refusal to comply with requests for mitigation would almost certainly result in the suffering States’ abject refusal to continue to pay their share.  This would, in turn, greatly aggravate States whose citizens hold the debts.   Even if, in principle, all States agreed on some accommodation, in practice there might be any number of reasons for delinquent payment.  For example, the debtor states might simply lack the resources with which to pay,  possibly because of mismanagement of their finances or inefficiencies in their governance.  Finally, one should not discount the general reluctance of men to part with money to repay past debts for things that are no longer relevant to the present.  They’d rather spend their money on  immediate wants.  Delays in payment, for whatever reason, would inevitably be a source of complaints, recriminations and quarrels.  There is probably nothing more likely to disturb the peace than nations being equally obligated to pay for something that does not equally benefit everyone.  There is nothing men are more contentious about than the payment of money.

Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to aggressions on the rights of those States whose citizens are injured by them, may be considered as another probable source of hostility. We are not authorized to expect that a more liberal or more equitable spirit would preside over the legislations of the individual States hereafter, if unrestrained by any additional checks, than we have heretofore seen in too many instances disgracing their several codes. We have observed the disposition to retaliation excited in Connecticut in consequence of the enormities perpetrated by the Legislature of Rhode Island; and we reasonably infer that, in similar cases, under other circumstances, a war, not of parchment, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious breaches of moral obligation and social justice.

Another source of potential hostility between the States would be the enactment of laws that violate private contracts.  Such laws would amount to attacks on the rights of those States whose citizens are injured by them.  Once beyond the influence of external governance, there is no reason to expect a sudden impulse towards fairness and liberality on the part of individual States in the creation of their legislation.  We’ve already witnessed too many instances of disgraceful laws.  We’ve seen how irritated Connecticut has become over the acts passed by Rhode Island’s Legislature.  We may reasonably infer, that such situations as this will, at some point result in a war, not of parchment, but of the sword.  Justice would seem to demand it.

The probability of incompatible alliances between the different States or confederacies and different foreign nations, and the effects of this situation upon the peace of the whole, have been sufficiently unfolded in some preceding papers. From the view they have exhibited of this part of the subject, this conclusion is to be drawn, that America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive, would, by the operation of such jarring alliances, be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions of the parts into which she was divided, would be likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them all. Divide et impera1 must be the motto of every nation that either hates or fears us.2

In earlier papers we have sufficiently covered the probability that incompatible alliances would be formed between the States or confederacies and different foreign nations.  We’ve discussed the likely effects at some length.  In summary, this picture of America, as a simple league rather than a unified nation, would be subject to becoming entangled in pernicious alliances with European powers.  The labyrinthine convolutions of European politics and wars would draw in the different States to the good of none.  After all, divide and conquer is by necessity the motto of every nation that either hates or fears us.

PUBLIUS

1. Divide and command.
2. In order that the whole subject of these papers may as soon as possible be laid before the public, it is proposed to publish them four times a week — on Tuesday in the New York Packet and on Thursday in the Daily Advertiser.

* The dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania was due to conflicting claims and wars over the Wyoming Valley. The Valley was first claimed by Pennsylvanians who were victorious in a battle with Connecticut settlers. However, Connecticut forces defeated Pennsylvania  on Christmas Day in 1775 (Battle of Rampart Rocks) which spurred the Connecticut General Assembly to establish Westmoreland County, which soon grew to 3,000 residents.
**Vermont was the 14th state admitted to the United States. It was not among the original 13 colonies because of a border dispute between New Hampshire and New York which was originally resolved in New York’s favor. However, Vermont residents fought New York’s land claims until declaring independence and soon thereafter being admitted to the union.

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